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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant appeals from. the lower Court's determination 
that Respondent has a partnership interest in the Squaw Peak Inc. 
complex together with rights reflected in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE 
The Trial Court awarded the Plaintiff a twenty-five 
(25) percent interest in a limit~d partnership involving all 
of the assets of Squaw Peqk Inc. together with other rights as 
set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the lower Court's decision 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent will not re-state all of the facts pertinent 
to this case on appeal but will add facts omitted by Appellant 
and correct any mis-stated facts. 
The Complaint in this case was filed August 10, 1979, 
and the trial was held November 15, 1979. Prior to the day of 
1 
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trial Plaintiff had filed a motion for a continuance because 
the Defendant had failed to answer interrogatories or produce 
documents (See line 4 page 2 of the Transcript of Trial). The 
Court denied Plaintiff's motion and the matter was heard that 
day by the Court. The Plaintiff's motion for continuance, to 
compel answers to interrogatories and to produce documents are 
not contained in this record. 
It is significant to note that Thomas C. Stubbs did 
not appear as a witness at the trial, even though he was the 
only Defendant with first-hand knowledge of the transaction 
involving the Plaintiff-Respondent. The trial judge had before 
him three documents (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1,2, and 3) together 
with other exhibits and the testimony of the Plaintiff. The 
testimony of the Plaintiff was uncontradicted and the defense 
relied entirely upon the defense of merger and failure of consider-
ation to defeat the Plaintiff-Respondent's claim. 
The statement by Appellant that the Plaintiff received 
$170,000.00 is an incorrect statement of fact (Transcript of 
Trial, page 13 line 26). The Respondent received $37,616.70 of 
the original $40,000.00 which was part of the $105,000.00 payable 
as per the Earnest Money Agreement. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) 
2 
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Plaintiff testified that the selling price was $170,000.00, 
payable $40,000.00 cash, the assumption of the existing $65,000.00 
mortgage and $65,000.00 payable as per Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. 
Plaintiff was to receive a one-fourth (1/4) interest in the 
Squaw Peak complex when developed and would retain the use of the 
home located on the property. The balance of the terms and 
conditions contained in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 were to constitute 
the agreement between the parties. Stubbs and Horton were to 
pay off the $65,000.00 balance which was owing to Wasatch Bank 
of Pleasant Grove. With this understanding the Respondent 
Appellant executed a Warranty Deed to Squaw Peak Inc., a non-
existent corporation. 
The earnest money agreement was dated September 5, 
1978 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1), the amendment thereto was dated 
September 22, 1978 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) and the Warranty 
Deed from Plaintiff to Squaw Peak Inc. was dated November 1, 
1978. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). It was the Plaintiff's conten-
tion that Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 constituted the agreement 
of the parties, artd a partnership was to be established. (See 
item 1 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 "limited partnership is taking 
title"). However, Defendant Stubbs breached the agreement by 
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having the property deeded to Squaw Peak Inc., a non-existent 
corporation. (date of incorporation March 16, 1979, - See line 
16, page 58 of the transcript of the trial). There is absolutely 
no evidence in the record of any consideration passing from 
Squaw Peak Inc. to Respondent - Judy Baxter. 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS 1,2 AND 4 WERE NOT MERGED INTO THE 
WARRANTY DEED. 
Counsel for Appellant cites the Stubbs v. Hemmert case 
to support his merger theory. However, he recites only that 
portion of the language in the case that supports his position. 
At page 169 of the Stubbs v. Hemmert case the following language 
by our Supreme Court appears determinative of the question of 
merger in this case: 
"However, if the original contract calls for 
performance by the seller of some act collateral 
to conveyance of title, his obligations with respect 
thereto survive the deed and are not extinguished 
by it." 38 A.L.R. 2d 1131, Sec. 2. 
Further, the Court stated: 
"Whether the terms of the contract are collateral, 
or are part of the obligation to convey and there-
fQre unenforceable after delivery of the deed, 
depends to a great extent on the interest of the 
parties with respect thereto." 
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In the case before the Court, the Respondent executed 
a Warranty Deed to Squaw Peak Inc., with the understanding that 
the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement and the addendum thereto, 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2, would be fully complied with by 
Appellant-Stubbs. It is clear from Plaintiff-Respondent's 
testimony that she was to receive a one-fourth (1/4) interest in 
a partnership to be formed, together with the use of a red brick 
home located on the property. There were other terms and con-
ditions as set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. The seller in 
this case met her obligation to convey by Warranty Deed, but the 
buyer seeks to defeat her claim by asserting the defense of 
"merger". Obviously, the terms and conditions found in Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 2 were separate and apart from the conveyance 
by deed and constituted the actual consideration for the convey-
ance. 
The language found in 17 Am Jur 2d 483, p 953 supports 
Respondent's position: (my emphasis by underlining) 
"Also, as a minimum prerequisite to any correct 
holding that one contract has been merged in 
another by reason of the fact that several 
documents relating to the same subject were 
executed on the same date, there must be some 
reasonable basis for finding that the parties so 
intented." 
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The Appellant cites the Flinco Inc., v. Goodyear 
Tire and Rubber Company, case 17 Utah 2d 173, 406 P 2d 911 
(19) for the proposition that the Plaintiff must show that a 
deed is not clear and ambiguous on its face, in order to over-
come the doctrine of merger. Again, that case and the Rasmussen 
v. Olsen case, 583 P. 2d 5 (Utah 1978) apply only to situations 
where the deed in its execution and delivery constituted the 
final agreement between the parties. Clearly in this case, the 
buyer ha~ agreed to terms and conditions which were separate 
and apart from the transfer by deed and actually constituted 
consideration by the buyer for the conveyance. 
In responding to Points II, III and IV in Appellant's 
brief, the merger argument in Point II is answered by Respondent's 
argument to Point I. At page 7 of Appellant's brief the follow-
ing underlined language clearly supports Appellant's argument: 
"The delivery and acceptance of a deed, executed 
pursuant to the provisions of a precedent contract 
for the sale of real property, ~ay merge rights 
conferred by the contract into it. Stipulations 
in the orior contract, of which conveyance is not 
a performance, are superseded bfi the deed if the 
parties intended to surrender t em." 
Obviously, the Appellant wants a merger in this case 
since that would defeat the Plaintiff-Respondent's 25% interest 
in the Squaw Peak project, and the rights awarded to her by the 
-6 
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Court pursuant to the addendum agreement, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. 
However, is there any evidence to support the Appellant's claim 
that the Plaintiff-Respondent intended to surrender her rights 
under the addendum agreement by executing the Warranty Deed? 
Apparently the District Court could find no evidence to support 
that proposition and ruled in favor of the Respondent. 
The arguments made by Appellant in Point III and IV 
concerning consideration are without any merit whatsoever. The 
Plaintiff-Respondent executed a Warranty Deed, dated November, 
1978, transfe~ring real property to Squaw Peak Inc. In return, 
she received $37,616. 70 cash, had a mortgage balance of $65,000.00 
paid by an SBA loan, and was to receive the benefits referred 
to in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, executed September 22, 1978. 
According to the record in this case the only failure of consid-
eration was on the part of Squaw Peak Inc., a non-entity on 
November 1, 1978. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court judgment should be upheld in all 
particulars and the Respondent should be awarded costs of this 
appeal. 
7 
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Respectfully submitted, 
MATT BILJANIC 
Attorney for espondent 
Certificate Of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to Thomas W. Seiler, Attorney for Appellant, 1325 South 
800 East, Suite 310, Orem, Utah 84057, postage prepaid, this /d I(' 
day of m~r.L 1 1980. 
~~~ ~~~~~-
~~ r:t:e~-----MATT BILJANIC ~ 
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